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Abstract: I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure
is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start
contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being
punished, and this generates contagion in the network. In contrast to earlier models in the literature,
contagion happens fast, as part of the best response of fully rational individuals. The network
topology has implications for whether contagion starts and the extent to which it spreads. I find
conditions under which an agent decides to be the first to contribute in order to generate contagion
in the network, as well as conditions for contribution due to a self-fulfilling fear of social pressure.
Keywords: social pressure; public goods; contagion
1. Introduction
Why do public good provision and collective action take place? Given that collective
action and public goods are by definition non-excludable, most individuals have no in-
centive to participate [1,2]. One possibility is that people participate out of a fear of social
sanctions. For example, large numbers of young British people enlisted in WWI out of
social pressure ([3], pp. 115–116). There is now a wealth of empirical evidence pointing out
the role of social pressure in the provision of a range of public goods, such as voting [4–7],
environmentally-friendly behavior [8–11], costly activism [12], charity donation [13], and
so forth.
I propose a model that is explicitly based on social pressure: individuals are embedded
in a network, and they receive disutility when their friends contribute to the public good
but they do not. Agents face a decision of whether to contribute to a public good: the
benefit b is public, but the cost c is private and larger than the benefit (c > b). At the
beginning of the game, nobody is contributing to the public good; the game is dynamic,
and every period the game ends with constant probability. If it continues, an agent is
selected randomly to revise her strategy. This simple model has interesting implications.
Whenever a group Y of agents contributes to the public good, there is an immediate
contagion in the social network—initially, friends of those in Y might find optimal to
contribute, as they do not want to suffer social pressure; however, they cannot revise their
strategy until they are randomly chosen to do so. Friends of friends of those in Y know
that friends of those in Y will contribute as soon as they are able to revise their strategy.
They measure their potential expected disutility from social pressure, and they compare it
with their certain cost of contributing to the public good: if the former is greater than the
latter, they also decide to contribute whenever they get to revise their strategy. As more
and more agents perform the same reasoning, a contagion in best responses is generated,
by which most individuals in the network end up contributing. The earlier literature
explained contagion over time [14,15] focusing on transitions between different equilibria:
every individual best-responds to everybody else in society, and behavior changes from
generation to generation, due to random shocks that shift behavior between different basins
of attraction. In contrast, in this paper behavior change happens as part of the equilibrium—
as agents contribute, they increase the incentives for other agents to contribute due to social
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pressure, generating a snowball effect. Crucially, unlike Kandori et al. [14], Young [15]
and Morris [16], in which behavior change happens as agents change their selected action,
in this paper contagion happens instantly as part of the best response of the individuals
in the network1. Therefore, rather than analyzing how different conventions evolve over
generations, I focus on how behavior can change almost instantly, due to contagion in the
network induced by social pressure.
The fact that social pressure can induce public good provision has implications for
a long-standing literature that has studied revolts and other forms of political collec-
tive action, by assuming that individuals derive a private benefit from the success of the
revolt [17–21]. One of the theoretical contributions of this paper is to provide a mechanism
that justifies participation in revolts and other forms of collective action, even in the absence
of such private benefit, as long as there is social pressure to participate. This paper therefore
reinforces the results of the aforementioned literature, by providing a micro-foundation
of why individuals would be willing to participate in revolts or other forms of political
activism in the first place2.
Leaders are important for collective action. For example, Rosa Parks is regarded
as a spearhead of the civil rights movement in the United States: in 1955, she refused
to give up her seat on a bus in protest at a racist law that segregated seats in public
transportation, an act that sparked a movement that eventually led to major advances in
civil rights in the United States [22]. In terms of the model, I call the first individual to
contribute the leader, and I show that under some conditions agents will decide to become
leaders, generating a large contagion and hence a large contribution in the network as
an outcome. This happens when the contagion generated by an agent i is so large that
the expected benefit from inducing others to contribute is larger than the private cost of
contributing: the contribution to the public good by the leader herself is negligible but,
because she manages to spread the contagion to a large fraction of the population, she has
incentives to contribute even when nobody has contributed before. It can also happen
that when several agents are afraid of social sanctions by others, those agents contribute
(thereby punishing those who do not contribute); therefore the fear of social sanctions
becomes self-fulfilling. The question of leadership is rich and complex, and there is a large
literature that has addressed it in the context of teams (see Reference [23], for a survey).
Precisely because of this complexity, there are only a handful of papers that have consider
leadership in a larger setting, where a single individual can tip the equilibrium of the whole
society. In a paper of technology/behavior diffusion, Morris [16] takes the innovators
as exogenous. As in the model presented in this paper, Ellison [24] considers the case in
which a single rational player can generate contagion to a whole population of myopic
agents, and Corsetti et al. [25] also consider the importance of a single player; however,
both of these papers take leaders as exogenous. Reference [26] consider a case where an
individual can change a social norm, and that social norm will stick to at least some future
generations; leaders in their model are endogenous, but only a special class of individuals
can become leaders. A contribution of the present paper is to analyze how and when a
“regular” individual endogenously becomes the leader of a large group.
One of the most intriguing questions in Economics is the evolution of cooperation in
humans, that is, how is it that provision of public goods and other cooperative behaviors is
so widespread in human populations, despite the obvious possibilities of exploitation by
selfish individuals [27]. Recent studies have showed that networks might play a crucial
role in answering this question—for example, the evolution of cooperation can be suc-
cessful if the ratio of benefit to cost b/c is larger than the average number of neighbors in
the network [28]. The present paper offers a complementary approach that emphasizes
1 Note that contagion will happen instantly, in the sense that most agents will choose to contribute whenever they are given the option to revise the
choice. However, they will have to wait for that option to revise their strategy (that happens stochastically), before they can change their action.
2 Reference [12] argues that the benefit b comes from the mobilization of personal ties in preexisting social networks. By explicitly separating the
public benefit b from the utility of mobilizing (or keeping) personal ties, the present paper makes clear when is it that social pressure is effective in
generating collective action.
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the role of forward looking behavior of agents, and that therefore can make coopera-
tion even more likely than in the case of myopic individuals. This paper is connected
to several other important literatures. Miguel and Gugerty [29] consider public good
provision with social sanctions that are a function of the share of contributors in the
whole population, unlike in the present model in which social sanctions happen locally
in the network3. Karlan et al. [32] and Jackson et al. [33] emphasize the idea that links
in the social network are valuable, because they provide a “collateral” in social interac-
tions. The present paper is similar in spirit to the idea that a person can use her links
in the social network as valuable assets, and applies this idea to public good provision4.
Calvó-Armengol and Jackson [37], Ali and Miller [38,39] consider cases in which individ-
uals only observe their neighbors, and the punishment behavior is endogenous; these
assumptions are the opposite to the ones in the present model, making our results com-
plementary, as they are extreme cases of what is likely to happen in real-world networks.
Bramoullé et al. [40] provide a general characterization of local-interaction games, in which
an agent’s payoff depends linearly on the actions taken by her neighbors, and Allouch [41]
analyzes a similar framework in which individuals’ payoffs depend non-linearly on the
public good contributed by their neighbors. These papers are essentially static and con-
sider that the public good is limited to the agents’ neighborhood; in contrast, I focus on
dynamic best-responses generated by local social pressure of a global public good. Gale-
otti and Goyal [42] consider the question of how to influence the agents in the network,
and Siegel [43] analyzes how the network topology can affect collective action. Finally, this
paper is related to the seminal literature in social dynamics [14–16] and the theoretical
literature on technology adoption, where it is usually found that a small group of connected
individuals can foster technology adoption in the network [44–48]5. I consider fully rational
and forward looking agents, which makes contagion fast, and generated by leaders who
do so in a calculated manner. A remarkable branch of this literature [50–53], considers
agents who are forward looking and can only revise their strategy as a Poisson process.
However, they consider a setting in which the action of any single agent does not affect
the payoff for the rest of the population, and because of that, there is no contagion or
leadership considerations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
analyzes the contagion that takes place in the network, once agents have started contribut-
ing. Section 4 analyzes under which conditions agents become leaders by contributing
when nobody has contributed before, as well as when contribution happens due to a
self-fulfilling fear of social pressure. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix A provides proofs
and details.
2. The Model
There is a finite number n of agents in the society, represented by set N. The structure
of society is given by a friendship network g ∈ {0, 1}N×N , where gij = 1 if agents i and j are
connected, and gij = 0 otherwise6. The network is undirected (gij = gji), that is, friendship
is reciprocal. Moreover, the network is connected, that is, any agent i ∈ N is a friend of at
3 In support of this intuition, References [30,31] have documented the importance of social pressure and social interactions in the context of
savings associations.
4 The literature on public good provision has tried to analyze how different characteristics of the population (such as ethnic, racial and socioeconomic
heterogeneity), affect the level of public good provided in equilibrium [34–36]. The results of this literature show that heterogeneity in the
mentioned characteristics is associated with lower public good provision. Even though the present model does not include heterogeneity along
those dimensions, I believe that it points to a causal mechanism: public good provision would indeed be lower if heterogeneity across ethnicity,
socioeconomic status, and so forth generates social norms with less sanctions, or makes it more likely that the network is fragmented in cliques that
do not interact with each other (see Example 3 below). Each of those cases would make social pressure not operational, and hence public good
provision to decline.
5 The model presented in this paper is especially related to Morris [16] in how contagion spreads through a network as a function of the network
characteristics (see also Reference [49]).
6 Throughout the paper I use the terms friends instead of the more common terminology neighbors for individuals who are connected, to make the
discussions easier to read.
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least another agent in N. Let Ni denote the set of agent i’s friends: Ni = {j ∈ N : gij = 1}.
Each agent faces a binary choice: to contribute or not to contribute to the public good.
Time is discrete, t = 1, 2, . . . , and each period only one agent (selected at random) can
revise her strategy. Therefore, every agent must play the same strategy in every period
until she has the opportunity to revise (for example, individuals can only enlist in the
military or participate in a protest whenever there is an opportunity to do so). The game
can be summarized every period t by a state St ∈ {0, 1}N , where sti denotes the action
last chosen by agent i, and sti = 1 means the agent contributed. Initially, that is, at t = 0,
we have S0 = {0}N , that is, every agent starts the game not contributing. At the beginning
of each period, the game continues with exogenous probability q, therefore, the game ends
with probability 1− q, in which case payoffs are realized. If the game continues, an agent
i ∈ N is selected at random to play, from a i.i.d. uniform distribution on the set of agents
N. Agent i at period t chooses an action from Ai(St), where
Ai(St) =
{
{0,1} if sti = 0,
{1} if sti = 1.
This means that once an agent has contributed, she must stick to that action for the rest
of the game. Intuitively, once an individual has enlisted in the military (or participated in a
violent protest) it is extremely difficult or impossible to undo such action (this assumption
is also typical of the literature on innovation diffusion [48])7. Given this structure, the game
is such that agents play one at a time, selected at random with replacement from the set N,
until the game ends. When the game ends and the state is ST for some final period t = T
(that is itself random), payoffs are realized, according to the following utility function,












− csTi . (1)
Agent i derives utility b from each agent who contributed and pays the private cost c
if she herself contributed9. Moreover, agent i suffers social pressure whenever she does
not contribute to the public good: in that case she incurs a disutility bψ for each friend
who contributed. Therefore, the total social punishment is proportional to the importance
of the public good b, the social pressure parameter ψ, and the number of friends who
contributed10. In the example of war, b would represent the marginal benefit of one more
soldier (assumed to be constant) in the defense of the country, c is the cost the individual
faces (the likelihood of being injured or killed, foregone wages, etc.) and ψ is a scaling
parameter that connects the benefit b with the social punishment for not participating.
Note that this punishment is unidirectional: those who participated costlessly punish
those who did not participate, as is the case in situations in which there are social norms
of “honor” and “shame” for participating or not in a certain activity [58]. With no social
7 In terms of the model, this prevents the usual punishment strategies in repeated games to play a role. For example, players cannot play a grim
trigger strategy, since they cannot undo their contributions. Note that the same could be accomplished by introducing a cost for reversing the
participation decision. As long as the cost would be large enough, then the model would be equivalent to the one presented here. I have chosen not
to include such “reversing costs”, in order to keep the model tractable.
8 A referee pointed out that those who never had a chance to contribute would likely not suffer social pressure in a realistic scenario, hence I assume
that the social punishment only happens when agent i had a chance to play. Note that this assumptions is without loss of generality.
9 I am assuming that there is a constant marginal benefit b for the public good. It could be argued that for revolutions and other regime-change
games, the marginal contribution is not constant, but rather exhibits a sharp jump at a given threshold (I thank a referee for pointing this out).
Since the focus of this paper is on contagion and leadership, I maintain the simple assumption of constant marginal benefit, in order to obtain
characterizations of those phenomena. Note that all results could be re-written considering an variable marginal benefit b(n), at the cost of making
the characterizations more cumbersome.
10 This assumes that agents value relationships “per se”, for example because having friends allows an individual to be connected to other agents in
the network. This can be partially justified by the literature in psychology and behavioral economics [54–57]. Despite this evidence, it can also be
considered as a “reduced form” utility from a more general model, where having friends signals some underlying disposition, like being honest.
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pressure (ψ = 0), it is easy to see that nobody would ever contribute in a subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE)11. To make this a game of public good provision, I assume that the
private cost is larger than the benefit an agent enjoys by contributing.
Assumption 1. c > b.
Given the probability q that the game continues, we can define Q as the probability
that a given agent i will be able to play before the game ends (for example, having an
opportunity to enlist before the war is over). Because the game continues each period with
a fixed probability q, and since the individual that plays each period is chosen uniformly
with replacement from the entire population, it follows that Q does not depend on time t
or on the identity of the player: hence Q is constant across periods and players. Moreover,
I assume that Q remains constant for any population size n (if this was not true, the results
would depend artificially on the size of the population, as will become clear in Section 3).
Assumption 2. The probability that the game continues q, as a function of n, is such that Q
is constant.
Therefore, the probability Q that an individual will be chosen before the game ends







. Solving for q(n), we obtain:
q(n) =
n
n− 1 + 1Q
. (2)
3. Contagion
In this section, I analyze how an agent’s contribution can affect how others behave
in the network, and generate a “wave of contagion” that spreads contribution by best-
response dynamics to a large fraction of the network. A very similar effect was analyzed in
Reference [16], in the context of myopic agents. The conditions I find are such that even
when agents are forward looking, they have as a dominant strategy to contribute. I will use
the concept of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE): σ is a SPE if it is a Nash equilibrium of
every subgame; in other words, if whenever an agent i is chosen to play, she best responds
to σ−i [59].
Because agents can only play when they are chosen to do so, we must distinguish
between those who have already contributed, and those who would like to do so if chosen
to play (but have not contributed yet).
Definition 1. An agent is contributing if she has chosen to contribute. An agent is predisposed
if she has not chosen to contribute yet, but will do so the next time she is chosen to revise her
strategy.
Definition 2. I define the social pressure threshold α∗ as the minimal α that makes it dominant
to contribute when an agent has at least α contributing friends, that is, c/b < 1 + ψα.
Consider the case when a set of agents Y have contributed to the public good, and
consider an agent j who has more friends in Y than the social pressure threshold α∗. That
means that j will contribute whenever she can, that is, she becomes predisposed. But note
that there might be many other agents like j, and all of these agents are now predisposed,
and will contribute whenever they can. Let Ȳ be the set of such predisposed agents.
11 Indeed, suppose that n− 1 agents have contributed, and the last agent has to decide whether to contribute. Because all other agents must contribute
in the future (as they cannot change their action to 0 anymore), there is no reputation loss for not contributing. Because c > b, she will choose not to.
But that means that previous actions of other agents cannot change what the last agent will do, and so the second-to-last agent does not contribute
either. By induction, no agent will ever contribute.
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Things become more interesting when we look at an agent i that does not have
friends in Y but does have friends in Ȳ. Agent i is suffering a type of “indirect” social
pressure: while none of her friends are contributing yet, they are predisposed and will
be contributing in the future. Therefore, agent i might want to contribute to avoid social
pressure preemptively, and therefore might become predisposed as well. Whether agent
i becomes predisposed depends on the cost-benefit analysis, in particular on the social
punishment and the cost of contributing with respect to the benefit, and on the likelihood
that her friends will end up contributing before the game ends.
This is the basis of contagion in this paper: agents who have predisposed friends
can become predisposed themselves, furthering the contagion (of predisposed agents) in
the network. As more and more agents become predisposed, it is more likely that the
next agent chosen to play will be predisposed, and hence will contribute, what increases
contribution in the network.
Proposition 1. If agent i has y contributing friends, and m predisposed friends, a sufficient
condition for her to contribute is:
c
b




P(x|m)(y + x), (3)
where P(x|m) is the probability that x out of m predisposed friends contribute before the game ends
and before agent i can play again, and can be computed recursively by
P(x|m) = m




The intuition for Proposition 1 is that the cost-to-benefit ratio for contributing (which
is higher than 1 by Assumption 1) cannot be too large in comparison with the expected
social punishment. If the condition in Equation (3) holds, the best response for the agent
is to contribute, and so she becomes predisposed. One interesting thing to note from
Proposition 1 is that the agent can decide to contribute, even if she only has predisposed
friends (but not necessarily contributing ones). There exists a minimal number m∗ of
predisposed friends that makes Equation (3) hold (even in the absence of contributing
friends), that is, such that for all m ≥ m∗ agents with at least m predisposed friends have as a
unique best response to contribute when chosen to revise their strategy, therefore becoming
themselves also predisposed.
Definition 3. The contagion threshold m∗ is the minimal number m of predisposed friends, that
satisfies the sufficient conditions in Equation (3) for an agent to contribute, even when none of her
friends are contributing.
Note that m∗ is decreasing in the public good benefit b, the social pressure parameter
ψ and the probability that an individual will play before the game ends Q; and increasing
in the private cost c. Hence, greater values of b, ψ or Q, or lower values of c make contagion
more likely. These comparative statics of m∗ with respect to the parameters of the model
are intuitive: higher benefit, lower cost, or higher social pressure all induce more contagion.
The fact that a higher Q (higher probability of revising before the game ends) induces
more contagion is also clear: not only does this generate more possibilities for agents to
contribute, but those possibilities are in turn anticipated by others, and that will make them
also more likely to contribute.
I turn now to study how contagion spreads through the network. I use the notation
from Reference [16]. Let X be a set of agents: I define operator Π0m(X) := X, and for k ≥ 1,
I define Πkm recursively:
Πkm(X) = Π
k−1
m (X) ∪ {i ∈ N : |Ni ∩Πk−1m (X)| ≥ m}.
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It is clear that this is an increasing sequence of sets, and I define Π∞m (X) as the limit of
that sequence. We can see then what happens when agents are contributing in the network
and the contagion threshold is m∗. Let Y be the set of all agents who have contributed.
Then, all agents who have at least α∗ friends in Y become predisposed, since α∗ is the
social pressure threshold. Let Ȳ be the set of agents who are either in Y or have become
predisposed because of the actions of agents in Y. But then, agents who have m∗ friends
in Ȳ also become predisposed, so the contagion spreads to the set Π1m∗(Ȳ). Proceeding
recursively, the contagion spreads through the network and in the end all agents in N∞m∗(Ȳ)
are predisposed. This contagion happens “instantly”, in the sense that it is not necessary
that more agents contribute, but rather the contagion happens by an expansion of best
responses that make agents predisposed, even before the next agent has a chance to play,
so when next period starts any agent in N∞m∗(Ȳ) will contribute if selected to play. Hence
we have the following result.
Proposition 2. In any SPE, when agents in X become predisposed, all agents in Π∞m∗(X) be-
come predisposed.
In particular, if there is a set of contributing agents Y, and Ȳ is the set that also
includes predisposed agents, then contagion will expand to set Π∞m∗(Ȳ). We have seen
how a contagion of best responses takes place in the network. This phenomenon is similar
to the contagion in References [16,60], and many other models of contagion, with two
remarkable differences. Firstly, all agents are forward looking, and contagion takes place
in anticipation to the actions of others. This is a contribution with respect to the previous
literature, where the individuals are either not forward looking (or only some individuals
are, as in Reference [24]), or they are unable to initiate a contagion. Secondly, contagion
happens in the same period that agent i contributes: because players are forward looking,
contagion is instantaneous. This is in contrast with the literature of social dynamics, where
contagion is supposed to happen in the long run or as the limit of some updating process12.
Interestingly, both aspects of the present model are related. It is precisely because agents
are rational and forward looking that contagion spreads so fast: everyone anticipates that
others will also contribute.
Note that despite the potential for multiple equilibria, agents who are affected by con-
tagion have as a dominant strategy to contribute, irrespectively of what non-predisposed
agents do. This comes at the expense of obtaining a lower bound on the actual contagion
on the network (the conditions I required here are stronger than necessary for a contagion
to happen, but if they do happen, we can unambiguously claim that contagion takes place).
As argued in the Introduction, I am interested in conditions that would generate collec-
tive action, hence the focus on sufficient conditions. I turn now to analyze how (and if)
contagion happens in a few interesting networks.
Example 1 (Regular lattice). Consider that agents belong to Zd, where Z is the set of integers,
and d is the dimension of the lattice13. Agents are friends if they are next to each other, i.e., gij = 1 if
∑dk=1 |xki − xkj | = 1, where xki is the k-th coordinate for agent i. In such a regular lattice, contagion
does not propagate for m∗ > 1. The reason is that friends of i are not friends themselves, that is, the
clustering coefficient is 014. Therefore, even if the friends of i become predisposed, their friends will
not become predisposed for m∗ > 1.
12 See References [61,62], for a discussion about the speed of contagion.
13 While in this example and the next the networks are infinite, that is just for simplicity. The examples can as easily be understood to be in the set ZdM ,
where ZM is the set of integers with absolute value at most M.
14 The clustering coefficient is defined as the number of triads of agents who are linked to each other, divided by the possible number of triads. Because
no three agents are all linked to each other in a regular lattice, the coefficient is 0.
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Example 2 (“Chess lattice”). Agents belong to Z2, and agents are friends if they are either next to
each other, or one step diagonally (as the king moves in chess), that is, gij = 1 if maxk |xki − xkj | = 1.
In this case, contagion happens for any contagion threshold m∗ ≤ 2. The case m∗ = 1 is trivial.
The case m∗ = 2 is derived from the fact that for every friend j of i, there exists at least one friend
k who is friend of both i and j. Therefore, when both i and j become predisposed, so does k. Since
this is true for all agents in the network, contagion ensues. Note that if m∗ = 3, contagion is not
guaranteed. For example, if both i and two of her friends who are at opposing diagonals become
predisposed, there is no agent k who is simultaneously friend of all three predisposed agents15.
Example 3 (Cliquish network). Consider network g, such that g is composed by a collection of
cliques (a clique C is a subset of g, such that if i ∈ C, then gij = 1 for all j ∈ C). In other words,
all agents in a clique are friends with everybody else in that clique. Cliques are connected to other
cliques via l2 links, that is, l agents of clique C are connected to each of l agents of clique C′ (and
vice versa). It can be showed that contagion will happen in cliquish networks if there are initially
m∗ predisposed agents in a given clique C, whenever l ≥ m∗ (of course, assuming that cliques have
more than m∗ agents). This is because there are l agents in clique C′, each of whom has l friends in
clique C, and since l ≥ m∗, each of these agents becomes predisposed. But then, agents in clique C′
have at least m∗ predisposed friends, and also become predisposed. This reasoning can be extended
to the whole network, assuming that there is a path from clique C to any other clique.
Until this point, I have considered how contagion spreads when a set of agents Y
contributes. In a sense, contagion exhibits strategic complements: the more likely an agent
is to contribute, the more likely others contribute because of the fear of social pressure.
However, why would an agent contribute in the first place and become a leader? I answer
this question in the next section.
4. Leadership
Hermalin [23] defines a leader as someone with voluntary followers, as opposed to
someone invested with authority (whom people are somewhat forced to obey). He suggests
that leaders serve three main roles: they are judges, experts and coordinators. While the
role of judges and experts are without a doubt important for leadership, I am especially
interested in the third role: leaders as coordinators. There are some situations in which
the behavior of agents following early adopters of a technology or behavior might not
be optimal, as in the case of herding [64]. However, very often there is a multiplicity of
equilibria (as in the case of different conventions) and the optimal course of action is to
coordinate on which equilibrium to choose. Hermalin [65] recognized that even in this
case, leaders might have an incentive to select one equilibrium over another, potentially
misleading their followers. He analyzed when is it possible to lead by example, so the
leader is invested in the choice that she is advocating. In the present model there is no
ex-ante conflict of interests between agents, as they all agree that more of the public good
is better. However, agents can still lead by example, because by contributing they recruit
their friends, and it is possible to generate a snowball of social contagion, as we saw in the
previous section.
I continue using the concept of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE). There are two
main classes of equilibria which are useful to consider, because they represent the two
extremes of the spectrum. At one extreme, social pressure equilibria are equilibria where
there is a set of agents Y such that they all fear that others will contribute, and that
if they do not contribute they will be punished, and so they end up contributing as
well. Therefore, the fear of punishment becomes self-fulfilling, and it is the reason why
15 Gagnon and Goyal [63] used the concept of the q-core, defined as the larger subcomponent gq of the network such that each individual in gq has
more than q friends in gq, to characterize the interaction between networks and markets. While at first sight it might seem that the q-core could
characterize contagion in the network, this is not so. For example, in the “chess lattice” of Example 2, the 7-core coincides with the entire network, as
every agent has exactly 8 friends in the network. And yet, as we saw, contagion is not guaranteed for m∗ = 3. The intuition behind why concepts
such as the q-core cannot be used to characterize contagion, is because they do not take into account the clustering in the network (or lack thereof).
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everybody in Y contributes. In this case, agents in Y are not concerned with inducing
others to contribute; only with avoiding social punishment. At the other extreme, we have
spearheaded equilibria, in which there is one agent i ∈ N, such that i contributes even
if nobody else would ever contribute. Agent i does not contribute out of social pressure
(after all, if she did not contribute, nobody ever would), but because she wants to generate
a contagion in the network, so that many individuals end up contributing, and i can enjoy
the public good generated by such contributions. Because of that, i is truly a leader, since
her reasons to act are to induce others do so.
4.1. Social Pressure Equilibria
I start by analyzing equilibria that demand very little on the part of individuals to
contribute, by exploiting the fear of social sanctions. In order to do that, I find a set of
agents Y where they all are willing to contribute, and each agent in Y contributes because
of the fear of social pressure from the rest of agents in Y. I formalize this intuition in the
following definition.
Definition 4. A set Y is m∗-cohesive if for all i ∈ Y, i ∈ Π∞m∗(Y\{i}).
That is, Y is m∗-cohesive if all agents who belong to Y become predisposed when the
rest of agents are predisposed (since contagion spreads by having m∗ predisposed friends).
Therefore, agents in Y contribute (even when nobody has done so) because the rest of Y is
also willing to contribute, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Definition 5. A social pressure equilibrium is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium such that there
exists a set Y in which all agents are predisposed even if nobody else would ever contribute (and
therefore agents in Y contribute whenever they revise their strategy).
Proposition 3. If there exists a m∗-cohesive set Y, then there is a SPE that is a social pressure equi-
librium.
Proposition 3 offers conditions under which a self-fulfilling fear of social pressure
leads to individuals in Y to contribute. This condition is interesting because it expands the
contexts in which the public good can be provided: in the case of civil rights movements,
the private cost of participating in protests and revolutions can be very high, but even in
these cases the conditions in Proposition 3 might still hold, what means that there might be
some SPE where contribution happens, even in cases with large private costs. Note that
these type of self-fulfilling social pressure equilibria can be inefficient because not only
do players not consider the social pressure externalities they impose on others, but the
equilibrium is more likely to arise the higher the social pressure parameter ψ is16.
Example 4 (Cliquish network redux: social pressure equilibrium). Consider again the network
from Example 3, that is composed of a collection of cliques, and recall that all agents in a clique are
friends with everybody else in that clique. Note that each clique C with at least m∗ + 1 individuals
is m∗-cohesive, as each individual in C becomes predisposed when everybody else in C is predisposed,
and this means that there is a SPE where agents in clique C are predisposed even if nobody ever
contributes. As we saw in Example 3, this then means that contagion extends to the entire network,
as long as there is a path from the initial clique C to every other clique.
16 The reasons why contribution happens sometimes and not some other times are difficult to pinpoint (as in every case of multiple equilibria), and
can very well be a matter of coordination. In Jimenez-Gomez [66], I analyze the conditions under which players are able to coordinate in revolting
against a regime; however it is necessary to assume that each individual has an incentive to participate. Therefore, as mentioned in the Introduction,
the present model provides some conditions under which it is incentive compatible to participate in collective action (due to social pressure).
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4.2. Spearheaded Equilibria
Definition 6. A spearheaded equilibrium is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium such that there exists
an agent i, for which her best response to every other player never contributing, is to contribute
(whenever she can revise her strategy).
I turn now to obtain sufficient conditions for a spearheaded equilibrium to occur.
Notice that the key requisite is that there is at least one individual i who has enough
incentives to contribute, even if nobody else would.
Definition 7. The leader contagion threshold is the minimal m∗∗ such that Equation (3) holds
for y = 1 and m = m∗∗.
In other words, the leader contagion threshold is the minimal number of predisposed
friends an agent j must have, given that she has one friend (the leader) already contributing,
so that the condition in Proposition 1 holds, and therefore it is a best response for j to also
contribute (hence becoming predisposed). Given the contagion threshold m∗, an agent
i needs to calculate how far she can spread contagion, if she wants to become a leader.
First, agent i needs to find which of her friends would become predisposed, if she decided
to contribute. Then, she must determine if the contagion generated by herself and the
predisposition of her friends, is enough to compensate her private cost. Proposition 4
formalizes this calculus.
Lemma 1. Let ζ(x) be the expected number of players, out of x possible agents, that get to play









h− 1 + 1Q
.
Proposition 4. Suppose that there is an agent i such that all other agents in the network have a
best response of not contributing when nobody else has contributed before, and that
c
b
< 1 + ζ(xi), (4)
where xi = |Π∞m∗(Yi)|, for Yi a m∗∗-cohesive subset of Ni. Then there is a spearheaded equilibrium
in which i contributes the first time she plays (and this generates contagion to set Π∞m∗(Yi).)
In other words, agent i becomes a leader because (1) she predicts that some of her
friends will follow suit if given the chance, and (2) the contagion generated by these “early
predisposed” agents is enough to make it worthwhile to contribute in the first place for i,
as the expected benefit in the public good by those who contribute will be larger than her
private cost17. In particular, when agent i contributes, she lowers the contagion threshold
for her friends from m∗ to m∗∗. If there is a subset of friends of i that is m∗∗-cohesive, then i
can count on social pressure to make those friends to contribute, and this sparks the usual
contagion in the social network. Social pressure and leadership are therefore completely
intertwined in the spearheaded equilibrium, as it combines social pressure (that generates
contagion in the m∗∗-cohesive group, and then further in the entire network), with the
cost-benefit analysis that the leader makes, regarding how much contribution to the public
good she can induce through her contribution. This also implies that forward looking
behavior is fundamental to leadership.
17 Note that ζ(xi) is between 0 and xi : when Q→ 0, so that the game ends immediately, nobody besides i gets to contribute; when Q→ 1, so that the
game lasts indefinitely, all agents in Π∞m∗ (Yi) get to contribute. Therefore, for intermediate values of Q, the expected number of other individuals
who get to contribute is somewhere between 0 and the size of Π∞m∗ (Yi): the more likely the game is to continue, the higher the right hand side of
Equation (4), and the more likely a spearheaded equilibrium can exist.
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Example 5 (Hub becomes a leader). Suppose that there is an agent L that is a hub: the network
is composed of a number K of cliques, and each member of the network (other than L) is connected
to all members of her clique, and to L, but to nobody else. When L chooses to contribute, we can
“transform” the scenario into a de facto series of K isolated cliques, but where each individual has a
friend who contributed (agent L). When the size of each clique C is such that m∗ > |C| > m∗∗,
there exists no social pressure equilibrium before L contributes, but after L contributes there exists a
social pressure equilibrium in which every individual ends up contributing. Therefore, if Equation (4)
holds for xi = |C| · K, then there exists a spearheaded equilibrium in which L contributes even if
nobody would ever do so otherwise.
Remarks on Spearheaded Equilibria
While the leader might decide it is worth starting a contagion in the network, can it
ever happen that this results in a detrimental outcome for agents in the network? The
answer is yes. While the leader finds it in her benefit to contribute and to set contagion in
motion (by Equation (4)), she does not internalize the “social pressure externalities” that
she imposes on others, that is, the social pressure that will be suffered by those who have
friends who contributed, but who did not contribute themselves. Note that the condition
in Equation (4) does not directly depend on ψ (only indirectly through the effect of ψ on
the contagion thresholds m∗ and m∗∗); and the higher the social pressure parameter ψ is,
the more likely the equilibrium will be inefficient. However, spearheaded equilibria seem
less likely to be inefficient than social pressure equilibria, for the simple reason that the
motivation to contribute in a spearheaded equilibrium is to generate sufficient contribution
to the public good, what can fully offset the social pressure disutility, whereas in the case of
social pressure equilibria they can arise even in cases in which not a substantial contagion
in the network will be generated.
Finally, consider contagion from the point of view of a principal who desires to prevent
contribution from happening (for example, a dictator who wants to stop a demonstration
from happening; or the Montgomery establishment who was against the bus boycott, in the
case of Rosa Parks). The principal can impose an extra cost δ > 0, only to the first person to
contribute. The intuition for this is that, while it is relatively easy for a government or an
organized minority to retaliate against a single person, it is very hard to fight against a mass
of individuals. For example, Rosa Parks and her husband suffered greatly as a consequence
of her becoming a leader of the civil rights movement: they lost their jobs, developed health
problems, and received hate call and mail persistently, until they left Montgomery due to
this persecution [67]. The key fact to observe is that δ affects the cost-to-benefit ratio for the
first agent to contribute, which now becomes c+δb . Note that, for spearheaded equilibria,
the left hand side of Equation (4) increases in δ and, for δ large enough, no individual finds
it optimal to become the first to contribute. If the principal has to pay an “intimidation
cost” δ per player to which it wants to increase the cost, this is an inexpensive way to do
so because, in equilibrium, the principal does not even need to pay the cost: the threat of
incurring the extra cost δ is enough to prevent an agent from becoming a leader. The same
holds true for social pressure equilibria. Note that in Equation (3) the left hand side is also
increasing in δ, and therefore for high enough δ, we have that m∗ increases. For δ large
enough, Y stops being m∗-cohesive, for the new value of m∗. In that case, agents in Y do
not contribute, because the threat of social pressure is not high enough as compared to the
private cost c + δ. Note that, once again, the principal only needs the threat of the higher
cost c + δ, in order to stop contagion before it even starts.
4.3. Limited Observability
So far I have implicitly made a somewhat stark assumption: individuals know the
network, and moreover they can perfectly observe the actions taken by others, even if they
are far away in the network. Instead, we could think that there is limited observability:
players cannot observe the network, only the actions taken by their friends and when those
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friends become predisposed18. Hence limited observability implies that the agents do not
know what those who are not their friends are choosing, but also know more about their
friends (in particular, that they can observe whether they become predisposed).
Lemma 2. The result of Proposition 2 still holds under limited observability, namely given a set X
of predisposed agents, contagion expands to Π∞m∗(X).
The proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward: because at each step k of contagion in set
Πkm∗ , agents only need to observe their friends in order to become predisposed, then conta-
gion happens identically under limited observability.
Corollary 1. If there exists a m∗-cohesive set Y, then there is a SPE where all agents in Y contribute
whenever they play (a social pressure equilibrium), even if there is limited observability.
Corollary 1 follows from the fact that, for contagion, it is only necessary that agents
observe whether their friends become predisposed, not the actions taken by those far away
from them in the network. Therefore, through limited observability, contagion spreads
because once agents observe enough of their friends predisposed, they become predisposed
themselves. On the other hand, for a spearheaded equilibrium under limited observability,
we would need one extra condition: that the agent i who is to become leader actually has
perfect observability (i.e., the same level of observability as assumed in previous sections).
Corollary 2. If agent i has perfect observability, then there exists a spearheaded equilibrium if the
conditions of Proposition 4 hold, even if there is limited observability for the rest of the population.
In summary, the results about leadership are almost intact with limited observabil-
ity. While the fact that agents can observe when their friends become predisposed is an
admittedly non-standard assumption, it is not very far-fetched when thinking about social
pressure applications, as agents in social networks are in close contact with their friends in
the network and the fact of becoming predisposed could be communicated (this is of course
outside of the present model). In summary, the fast contagion in best responses showed to
happen in the present model, would survive under a fairly reasonable assumption about
limited observability.
5. Conclusions
I developed a model of collective action where the agents are forward looking, have
concerns for social sanctions, and can only revise their actions stochastically. I analyzed
a contagion process through the network, by which agents become predisposed (i.e.,
are willing to contribute to collective action whenever they can revise their strategy) by
best response dynamics. In contrast to earlier models in the literature of social dynamics
in which contagion is usually a slow process (that requires several generations of agents
best-responding), contagion in the present model happens immediately, due to the forward
looking nature of agents. This insight contributes to understanding collective action
and public good provision (and more generally the evolution of cooperation in humans),
by showing that forward looking agents are even more likely to cooperate. It also provides
microfoundations to a long-standing literature that assumes that the decision to participate
in collective action and revolutions can be modeled as a coordination game [17–21].
I also analyzed leadership: when an agent chooses to contribute even when nobody
has contributed so far. One condition that suffices for contribution happening, is that the
18 Formally, we can assume that after each period, all agents observe the actions of their friends, and they become predisposed if they will contribute
whenever they can revise their strategy. If any agent that was not predisposed has become predisposed, then again some agents might become
predisposed, and so forth. This process continues until no agent becomes predisposed, and at that moment the next period begins. Note that I am
assuming that agents still have knowledge of the network, even if they cannot observe the actions (or predisposition state) of those who are not
their friends.
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expected gain from contributions by those affected by the contagion is larger than the
private cost of contributing. This is the case when a single agent can use her influence on
her friends, who in turn use their influence on theirs, to generate a wave of contributions
in the network, that eventually compensates for the private cost of contributing in the
first place. Forward looking behavior is critical: it is because agents are able to foresee
the contagion that they are capable of generating, that they decide to lead by contributing.
Under less demanding conditions there can also be contribution: in these cases, agents
start contributing not because of desire of generating contagion, but out of a self-fulfilling
fear of being socially sanctioned.
This paper contributes to the literature in social dynamics by considering a population
fully composed of forward looking rational agents, through a simple model that can be eas-
ily applied to many other contexts. Indeed, the strength of the model lies in its simplicity:
the results can be obtained without resorting to convoluted proofs or arguments. However,
to achieve such simple setup, a number of assumptions had to be made, including the
exogeneity of the network and of social pressure. Those assumptions were made to show
the existence and properties of fast contagion due to best-responses for a relevant class
of games. However, a promising avenue of future research consists on improving these
assumptions and finding weaker conditions under which meaningful results could be
derived. Several extensions could be developed for the baseline model. I have assumed
homogeneity in the benefits, costs, and punishments. Introducing heterogeneity would
generate new interesting predictions; in particular, analyzing how heterogeneity in the pa-
rameters interacts with homophily (the tendency of people to have friends like themselves),
when both heterogeneity and homophily take place along the same dimension (i.e., agents
with lower cost of contribution tend to be friends with each other). This could be modeled
using scale-free networks (in which the degree distribution has fat tails, and that better
capture real-world networks such as the Internet or Twitter, [68]) and that have already
been used to analyze the Prisoner’s Dilemma with heterogeneous investments [69,70].
This would open up new questions, such as whether the network would be robust to a
government trying to stifle potential leaders, for example by removing hubs from the net-
work [71]. A related question is how dispersion in those variables, as measured by Second
Order Stochastic Dominance, affects contagion and leadership. For example, it is not clear
ex-ante that more dispersion in cost would lead unambiguously to more contagion, or
more leadership.
In conclusion, this paper offers a simple explanation for why individuals participate
in collective action in the presence of social pressure. The conclusions on this paper can
be incorporated to the literature on political revolutions as a justification of why (and
how) it is incentive compatible, under certain circumstances, for individuals to participate
in collective action, giving a more solid microfoundation to reduced-form models of
revolutions. More generally, the paper offers a simple and tractable model that can be
applied in any area of economics, to the empirically ubiquitous finding that social pressure
generates public good in social networks.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. We are interested in sufficient conditions, and therefore I will
consider a lower bound for the payoff of contributing, and an upper bound on the payoff
for not contributing. The lower bound on the payoff for an agent for contributing, is given
by b− c. The upper bound on expected payoff for not contributing can be calculated from
the different possibilities of punishment, namely the different events that a number of the
agent’s predisposed friends get to contribute before the game ends and before the agent can
revise her strategy. In particular, let P(x|m) be the probability that, out of m predisposed
friends of agent i, exactly x ≤ m revise their strategy (hence contributing), before the game
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Equipped with these probabilities, we can now compute an upper bound on the
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Therefore, a sufficient condition for the to find optimal to contribute (and hence









Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is by induction. By definition, X is a set of predisposed
agents, what proves the case k = 0. Now, suppose the statement is true for k, what
means that all individuals in Πkm∗(X) are predisposed. Then, by the definition of m
∗, all
agents with at least m∗ friends in the set Πkm∗(X) will also become predisposed, what
implies that individuals in Πk+1m∗ (X) = Π
k
m∗(X) ∪ {i ∈ N : |Ni ∩Πkm∗(X)| ≥ m∗} become
predisposed.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let σ be the strategy profile where agents in Y always contribute
(and all j 6∈ Y best respond to N\Y). Consider an agent i ∈ Y. Because agents in Y\{i} are
predisposed, by Proposition 2, all agents in Π∞m∗(Y\{i}), become predisposed. But since Y
is m∗-cohesive, that means that i ∈ Π∞m∗(Y\{i}), and therefore i becomes predisposed, so it
is a best response for i to contribute.










and ζ(1) = Q, by the definition of Q. Solving for ζ(x), and using the formula for q(n) as a
function of Q, we have that for x > 1, ζ(x) = x[1+ζ(x−1)]
x−1+ 1Q
. I will show now that ζ is given by:
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(A2)
The proof is by induction. For x = 1, ζ(1) = Q, and from Equation (A2), we find the
same value. Now, for the induction step, suppose that Equation (A2) holds up to x, and I
will prove it for x + 1:
ζ(x + 1) =



















































l − 1 + 1Q
.
And this concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. First, conditional on agent i contributing, note that an argument
identical to that in Proposition 3 implies that all agents in Yi become predisposed, for Yi a
m∗∗-cohesive subset of Ni (the argument is identical, but m∗ is replaced by m∗∗, since all
friends of i would have at least one friend who contributed). Then, Proposition 3 implies
that all agents in set Π∞m∗(Yi) also become predisposed. Hence, agent i knows that if she con-
tributes, the expected contribution in the network is at least b(1+ ζ(xi)) for xi = |Π∞m∗(Yi)|,
and if she does not contribute her expected payoff is zero (because all other agents would
never contribute). Therefore, she finds it optimal to contribute whenever Equation (4)
holds, and hence contributing is a best response to nobody ever contributing.
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof follows from Proposition 3 and Lemma 2: given i ∈ Y and
an initial set Y\{i} of predisposed agents, each step of contagion in Πkm∗(Y\{i}) happens
under limited observability of actions, and therefore i ∈ Π∞m∗(Y\{i}), so i is predisposed,
and this holds for all i ∈ Y.
Proof of Corollary 2. The proof follows from Proposition 4 and Lemma 2. Note that from
Lemma 2, we have that once agent i contributes, contagion first extends to set Yi (defined as
a m∗∗-cohesive set of friends of i), and then to set Π∞m∗(Yi), even under limited observability.
Therefore, the only condition that is necessary is that agent i contributes, and if she has
perfect observability, then she can perform the cost-benefit analysis in Equation (4), and it
is a best response for her to contribute whenever Equation (4) holds.
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